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Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between the prevailing liquidity conditions (such as measures
of money, credit and interest rates) and developments in asset prices from a monetary analysis
perspective. After having identified periods of sustained excess liquidity, we analyse under which
conditions they are more likely to be followed by an asset price boom. The results from a descriptive
analysis of the developments in a number of macroeconomic and financial variables suggest that
periods of sustained excess liquidity that are accompanied by strong economic activity, low interest
rates, high real credit growth and low inflation have a higher likelihood of being followed by an asset
price boom. This conclusion is also confirmed by a logit analysis.
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1 .  I NTRODUCTION
The empirical research on leading indicators for inflation is vast compared to that on leading
indicators for asset price booms. This differential treatment can most likely be explained by the fact
that monetary policy is geared towards containing consumer price inflation, while central banks
generally do not have a target for asset price inflation. However, the large swings in asset prices
(equity as well as real estate) over the past decade and their impact on the real economy have
recently attracted the attention of researchers and policymakers alike.
One of the issues investigated in recent years is the role of monetary variables in predicting periods
of financial instability or asset price booms that lead to costly recessions in the bust phase. Borio
and Lowe (2002; 2004), for example, find that sustained strong credit growth combined with large
rises in asset prices increases the probability of an episode of financial instability or a banking crisis.
In the same vein, Detken and Smets (2004) suggest that money and credit growth could be useful
indicators to distinguish between high-cost booms (in terms of the subsequent drop in real GDP)
and low-cost booms relatively early on. They find that real money growth is significantly higher
during the two-year pre-boom period for the high-cost booms, while during the asset price boom
itself, credit growth is significantly higher too. Finally, in a follow-up paper, Adalid and Detken (2007)
again find a strong association between money growth and those asset price booms that led to
more costly recessions in the bust phase.
This paper differs from the work cited above in two ways. First, it analyses the issue from the
opposite perspective, namely whether periods of excess liquidity are generally followed by asset
price booms. The finding that most high-cost booms are preceded by high money growth does not
necessarily imply that all periods of excess liquidity signal an imminent asset price boom. For
policymakers, however, it is important to know to what extent they can rely on a specific (set of)
variable(s) as a warning signal for asset price booms. It is particularly important to know whether a
specific event is often followed by an asset price boom, or whether this is only the case under
certain conditions, such as a combination of events, as suggested by Borio and Lowe (2002; 2004).
Second, this paper does not aim at constructing the best leading indicator for asset price booms,
but instead focuses on the potential role of one particular indicator, namely excess liquidity. This
choice can be motivated by the prominent role that money plays within the monetary policy strategy
of the Eurosystem. While monetary analysis initially concentrated on money's role as an indicator of
inflationary pressures in the medium to longer term, more recently it has also been used in the
context of asset price developments (Issing, 2003). For instance, in the Editorial of its October 2004
Monthly Bulletin, the ECB warns that "... high excess liquidity and strong credit growth could
become a source of substantial asset price increases". Contrary to Gouteron and Szpiro (2005),
who find that excess liquidity does not generally help to explain movements in stock prices or2 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
residential property prices, this paper stresses the importance of allowing for non-linearities in the
relationship between liquidity and asset prices and of analysing combinations of events. To take
account of the likely non-linearities, we restrict our set of observations to periods of sustained
excess liquidity. But even then, we find that only about one-third of these periods have been
followed by an asset price boom, which seems to confirm the conclusion of Gouteron and Szpiro
(2005) and clearly warns against a 'naive' type of monetary analysis. We therefore investigate
whether information on the developments in other variables could help in distinguishing the periods
that have been followed by an asset price boom from those that have not. We find that specific
combinations of events do seem to increase the likelihood of periods of sustained excess liquidity
being followed by asset price booms.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section is devoted to the selection of the periods
of sustained excess liquidity and describes them in terms of their length, the typical size of the
money gap and their distribution over time and across countries. Section 3 analyses a number of
macroeconomic and financial developments associated with the identified periods of sustained
excess liquidity. In section 4, we report how often the identified excess liquidity periods have been
followed by an asset price boom. Section 5 analyses which macroeconomic and/or financial
variables might help to signal an increased risk of an imminent asset price boom. Finally, section 6
deals with the real-time identification of the periods of sustained excess liquidity and section 7
concludes.
2 .  I DENTIFICATION OF PERIODS OF SUSTAINED EXCESS LIQUIDITY
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of quarterly figures for 18 industrial countries, namely
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. The sample starts in the first quarter of 1970 (whenever possible) and ends in the
last quarter of 2005.
In line with Borio and Lowe (2002; 2004), we focus on cumulative imbalances, rather than on
growth rates, when identifying periods of excess liquidity or asset price booms. This implies that
excess liquidity can be the result not only of a relatively short period of very strong money growth,
but also of a sustained period of above-average money growth. This focus on cumulative
imbalances or gap measures also implies that we disregard the long-term developments to a certain
extent, while it is exactly the long-term trend in monetary data that is generally found to contain
most of the information regarding future inflation. As a consequence, the relative impact of the noisy
part of monetary developments could become too large in our analysis compared to the signal, inNBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 3
which case the link between money and asset prices could be underestimated. However, we try to
limit the impact of the noisy part by setting a lower limit to the length of the periods of sustained
excess liquidity. Moreover, taking out the long-term trend of monetary data also has the advantage
that it results in data that are probably more comparable to the current situation in which the
nominal trend can be considered to be relatively flat.
We define a   period of sustained excess liquidity as at least three consecutive quarters during which
the money gap exceeds a specified cut-off level. The money gap is defined as the deviation of the
broad money-to-GDP ratio from its trend level, which in turn is calculated as the HP-filtered series of
the ratio of broad money to GDP, using a smoothing parameter of 10000. The choice of the cut-off
level is based on the statistical properties of the calculated money gaps. As the standard deviation
of the money gap series for all countries combined is equal to 3.68%, the cut-off level is set at
3.75%.
Three 'corrections' have been applied. First, whenever three quarters of excess liquidity are
separated by one quarter during which the money gap is still positive (but smaller than the cut-off
level) the four quarters are considered as a period of sustained excess liquidity. Second, whenever
two periods of sustained excess liquidity are separated by no more than four quarters, they are
combined into one period. Third, the periods of excess liquidity that extend to the second half of
2003 or beyond are excluded from the analysis, as they do not enable us to determine whether or
not the subsequent two-year period witnessed the start of an asset price boom1.
This procedure results in the selection of 40 periods of sustained excess liquidity. Assuming that the
best approximation of a typical period is the median of the distribution of all excess liquidity periods
(to minimise the impact of outliers), we find that a period of sustained excess liquidity typically lasts
for about seven quarters and is characterised by an average money gap of about 5¾%. As can be
seen in Chart 1, these figures hide considerable heterogeneity. The length of the identified excess
liquidity periods ranges from the imposed minimum of three quarters (e.g. in Germany, Ireland and
Japan) to four years (in Switzerland during the second half of the 1990s). The smallest average
money gap of 3.7% even stood slightly below the cut-off level (because two intermediate quarters
were included), whereas the largest average money gap amounted to 9.3%. In general, there
seems to be a positive relationship between the length of the excess liquidity period and the
average money gap. There are two notable exceptions, namely Norway and Spain which both
witnessed a rather long period of excess liquidity in the 1980s, during which the average money gap
was relatively low.
1   An asset price boom is defined in section 4 of the paper as a period of at least three consecutive quarters
during which asset prices exceed their trend level by more than a specified percentage.4 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007






























When classifying a period of sustained excess liquidity in the decade that contains its midpoint,
several observations can be made. It is not possible to derive the typical features of periods of
sustained excess liquidity in the 2000s, as we have retained only one such episode in our sample,
so we disregard that period in this part of the analysis. Table 1 shows that the 1990s witnessed the
largest number of sustained excess liquidity periods. At the same time, these were typically
relatively short and most of them were characterised by a rather low average money gap. By
contrast, the 1970s periods usually recorded the largest average money gap, while they were again
relatively short. The longest periods of sustained excess liquidity were found in the 1980s, but the
average money gap during these periods was generally rather low.
Table 1:  Distribution of the periods of sustained excess liquidity over time




1st quartile Median 3rd  quartile  1st  quartile Median 3rd quartile
1970-2003 40 4.8 7.0 8.0 4.6 5.7 7.3
1970-1979 12 4.0 6.5 8.0 5.7 6.6 7.1
1980-1989 9 6.0 7.0 9.0 4.3 5.1 6.8
1990-1999 18 4.3 6.5 8.0 4.6 5.2 7.4
The distribution of these periods of sustained excess liquidity across countries is not uniform either:
the number of periods ranges from zero in France to five in New Zealand. Half of the countries
witnessed two periods of sustained excess liquidity.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 5











































3 .  M ACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER PERIODS OF
SUSTAINED EXCESS LIQUIDITY
In order to find some common patterns in macroeconomic and financial developments around
periods of sustained excess liquidity, we analyse for each period a number of indicators over a
variable time span, namely from two years before the start of the excess liquidity period up to two
years after its end. Table 2 reports some summary statistics for these data. For this purpose, the
quarterly data are first averaged over five specific time spans, namely each of the two years before
the start of the excess liquidity period, the period itself and each of the two years after its end. The
table then reports the median values across all identified periods of sustained excess liquidity of
these average developments for each of the five time spans, as well as the median value of the
variables across 'normal' periods, the latter being defined as those periods that witnessed neither
sustained excess liquidity nor a sustained shortage of liquidity. We again use medians in this
context instead of averages in order to avoid the typical developments being influenced by outliers.
The selection of macroeconomic and financial indicators is motivated by our aim to explain both the
causes and the consequences of the build-up of excess liquidity, but we are constrained by the
availability of data. Most of the data in this section refer to annual growth rates of data expressed in
real terms, such as real money growth, real GDP growth, real credit growth and real aggregate
asset price inflation. As interest rates and inflation are characterised by a clear downward nominal
trend over the time span considered, we use gap measures for these variables, i.e. deviations from
their HP-filtered trend. Finally, we also show the results for the real aggregate asset price gap,
because we will use this gap measure in the next section to define an aggregate asset price boom.6 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
Table 2:  Median values of some macroeconomic and financial variables before, during and after the

















Money gap -1.1 0.4 5.7 0.4 -2.4 -0.3
Real money growth 4.7 5.4 6.6 -0.1 0.3 3.7
Real GDP growth 2.8 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.1 3.0
Short-term interest rate gap 0.3 0.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 -0.3
Long-term interest rate gap 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0
Real credit growth 4.7 5.3 5.3 1.6 2.2 4.6
Inflation gap -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 0.6 0.5 -0.1
Real  aggregate  asset  price  inflation  1.1 1.5 2.2 0.9 -1.0 1.6
Real aggregate asset price gap -1.0 -1.0 0.8 0.2 -0.7 -1.4
Note: 'Normal' periods which witnessed neither excess liquidity nor liquidity shortage are characterised by a real money gap
which lies between -3.75 and 3.75%.
Table 2 shows that the developments in the money gap before and after a period of sustained
excess liquidity are quite different from the developments during such a period. The money gap
usually remains negative up to three quarters before the start of the excess liquidity period -
although real money growth is already quite strong in the two years leading up to the excess
liquidity period - but subsequently picks up sharply. After the end of an excess liquidity period, real
money growth is generally so low that it takes only three quarters for the large money gap to fall into
negative territory again.
In order to analyse which variables may explain the occurrence of a period of sustained excess
liquidity, we look at the developments in the traditional determinants of money demand, namely
economic activity and opportunity costs, particularly during and in the run-up to the periods of
sustained excess liquidity. We find no evidence that most excess liquidity periods would have been
driven by a business cycle upturn: real GDP growth even seems to be somewhat lower both before
and during a typical excess liquidity period than during a 'normal' period, although the difference is
statistically insignificant. The interest rate gaps, however, seem to play a more important role. The
periods of strong real money growth (before and during the excess liquidity periods) are generally
characterised by a declining long-term interest rate gap and thus falling opportunity costs of holding
money. Similarly, after the end of the excess liquidity period, the long-term interest rate gap typically
rises while real money growth falls. The short-term interest rate gap tends to reach a peak only
shortly before the start of an excess liquidity period, but then drops considerably up until the first
few quarters of the excess liquidity period. This suggests that periods of sustained excess liquidity
have often been accompanied by a loosening of monetary policy and the induced fall in theNBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 7
opportunity costs of holding money. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the developments
in real credit growth were very similar to those in real money growth, although the changes in credit
growth were generally smaller and more gradual.
As periods of sustained excess liquidity often seem to have been accompanied by a decline in the
interest rate gaps, such periods might well be signalling a rise in consumer prices and/or asset
prices. To which extent this has been the case can be checked in the lower part of Table 2. The
reported median values suggest that most of the identified excess liquidity periods indeed have
been followed by an increase in the inflation gap.
The interpretation of the developments in asset prices following a period of sustained excess
liquidity is less clear-cut, however. The analysis is based on a real aggregate asset price index,
calculated by the BIS, which combines information on a stock market index, a price index for
residential property and one for commercial property when available and weights these components
by estimates of the relative shares of these asset classes in the private sector's wealth2. The
median values reported in the lower part of Table 2 indicate that the rate of growth of this real
aggregate asset price index typically reaches a peak during the excess liquidity period and
moderates considerably afterwards. Looking at the real aggregate asset price gap instead yields a
similar result. This suggests that a large proportion of the excess liquidity periods have not been
followed by higher asset price inflation, in which case this behaviour would not turn up in the median
values.
While this evidence does not imply that periods of sustained excess liquidity cannot be used as a
signalling device for imminent asset price booms, it does suggest that some additional conditions
will need to be met before a period of sustained excess liquidity is likely to be followed by higher
real aggregate asset price inflation. In what follows, we will analyse how often and under which
circumstances a period of sustained excess liquidity is most likely to be followed by an asset price
boom.
4 .  H OW OFTEN ARE THESE EXCESS LIQUIDITY PERIODS FOLLOWED BY AN ASSET PRICE BOOM?
An asset price boom is defined as a period of at least three consecutive quarters during which the
real aggregate asset price index exceeds its trend level by more than 10% (i.e. approximately one
standard deviation). This trend level is calculated by running a smooth HP-filter on the series of the
2   The methodology is described in detail in Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994). We thank Steve Arthur for
kindly supplying us with the data on this real aggregate asset price index.8 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
real aggregate asset price index. One 'correction' has been applied: as was the case when
identifying the excess liquidity periods, whenever three quarters of an exceptionally large asset
price gap are separated by one quarter during which the gap is still positive but smaller than the cut-
off level, the four quarters are considered as an asset price boom.
According to this procedure, only about one-third of the periods of sustained excess liquidity, i.e. 14
out of 40, have been followed by an asset price boom, in that the identified boom starts either
during the period of sustained excess liquidity or within two years after the end of such a period.
This ratio of periods of sustained excess liquidity that have been followed by an aggregate asset
price boom - henceforth XLB periods - was not uniformly distributed over time, as can be seen in
Table 3 where the periods of sustained excess liquidity are categorised on the basis of their
midpoint. While half of the excess liquidity periods of the 1970s have been followed by an asset
price boom (6 out of 12), this ratio declined to one-third (3 out of 9) for the 1980s periods and further
to about one-fourth (5 out of 18) for the 1990s periods. The most recent period of sustained excess
liquidity was not followed by an asset price boom, but that sample is clearly too small to draw any
conclusion. Nevertheless, it seems that the chances of an excess liquidity period being followed by
an asset price boom - as we defined it - have declined over time.
Table 3:  Distribution of the excess liquidity periods depending on whether or not they were followed
by an asset price boom
Number of periods Followed by a boom Not followed by a boom
1970-2003 40 14 35% 26 65%
1970-1979 12 6 50% 6 50%
1980-1989 9 3 33% 6 67%
1990-1999 18 5 28% 13 72%
2000-2003 1 0 0% 1 100%
It should be mentioned that there are also quite a few asset price booms that have not been
preceded by a period of sustained excess liquidity. In fact, out of the 42 aggregate asset price
booms for which we have obtained money data in the two years before their start, only 14 were
preceded by a period of sustained excess liquidity. The analysis presented in this paper should
therefore in no way be seen as an attempt to construct the best leading indicator for asset price
booms. At the same time, the link between excess liquidity and asset price booms is also more
complex than we assume in this paper, as suggested by the fact that our sample of aggregate asset
price booms also contains 13 boom periods that were followed by a period of sustained excess
liquidity, suggesting that the temporal precedence is not unidirectional.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 9
5 .  W HAT DETERMINES WHETHER OR NOT A PERIOD OF SUSTAINED EXCESS LIQUIDITY IS FOLLOWED BY AN
ASSET PRICE BOOM?
The results presented in this section are based on an event study and thus only refer to the timing
of phenomena such as periods of sustained excess liquidity and asset price booms. The results
should therefore not be interpreted as implying causality between excess liquidity and asset price
booms.
As a first step, we analyse, in a purely descriptive way, whether some macroeconomic and financial
indicators could help differentiate between the XLB periods and those periods of sustained excess
liquidity that have not been followed by an aggregate asset price boom. This approach has a
number of disadvantages, however. First, the information is summarised by looking at the median
values of the distribution only, which implies that quite a lot of information is ignored. Second, this
descriptive analysis does not permit the impact of the relevant variables to be quantified and thus
their relative importance to be assessed. Third, it is a simple bivariate approach which does not take
account of possible interactions between the candidate explanatory variables. In order to overcome
these disadvantages, we also estimate logit models that enable a formal quantification of the
relative importance of those macroeconomic and financial variables that emerged from the
descriptive analysis as most likely candidates to differentiate between the XLB periods and the
other periods of sustained excess liquidity.
5.1  A  descriptive  analysis
The following macroeconomic and financial indicators are considered as potential explanatory
variables: the length of the excess liquidity period, the money gap, the number of countries that
simultaneously witness a period of excess liquidity (labelled synchronisation), real money growth,
real GDP growth, the short-term interest rate gap, the long-term interest rate gap, real credit growth,
the inflation gap and the real aggregate asset price inflation rate. For each of these variables, we
calculate their average value during each period of sustained excess liquidity. We then categorise
these average values into two subgroups according to whether or not the period has been followed
by an asset price boom. We further assume that the distribution of these two subgroups can be
summarised by their median value and then test whether the two medians are significantly different
from one another by means of the rank-based Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney WMW-test. In order to limit
the impact of the (variable) length of these excess liquidity periods, we also calculate the average
value of the indicators of interest over the first three quarters of each excess liquidity period. While
this could be seen as a kind of robustness check, it could also help to detect changes in typical
behaviour during longer periods of sustained excess liquidity.10 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
Table  4:  Macroeconomic and financial developments during excess liquidity periods, categorised
according to whether or not they have been followed by an asset price boom
Periods of sustained excess liquidity
Whole period First three quarters
Boom  No  boom  WMW-test  Boom  No  boom WMW-test
Real money growth 7.8 6.3 10.1 8.3 **
Real GDP growth 3.5 1.5 *** 2.9 1.1 **
Short-term interest rate gap -0.8 0.3 ** -1.8 1.1 ***
Long-term interest rate gap -0.7 0.0 ** -0.9 0.4 ***
Real credit growth 8.1 4.4 * 9.2 4.2
Length 8.0 6.5
Money gap 6.6 5.4 5.6 5.3
Synchronisation 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.8
Inflation gap -1.0 -0.2 ** -1.3 -0.4 **
Real aggregate asset price inflation 5.8 -1.1 *** 6.1 -1.6 ***
Note: The asterisks (***,** and *) denote that the null hypothesis of equal medians is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively on the basis of the rank-based Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
The results - summarised in Table 4 above - indicate that XLB periods typically recorded stronger
real money growth, particularly during the first three quarters of the period, than those excess
liquidity periods that were not followed by a boom. This stronger real money growth during XLB
periods seems to have been fuelled by the traditional determinants of money demand, namely
economic activity and opportunity costs. A typical XLB period is characterised by stronger real GDP
growth and by lower interest rate gaps. The hypothesis that strong real money growth during XLB
periods is driven by its traditional determinants is further supported by the evidence that real credit
growth seems to be higher during XLB periods as well.
These XLB periods also seem to have been generally longer and characterised by a larger money
gap, but these differences are statistically not significant at the 10% level. The degree of
synchronisation across countries - measured as the number of countries that simultaneously
witness a period of sustained excess liquidity - is found to always have been quite low, which
probably explains why this variable does not seem to differ between a typical XLB period and a
typical period that is not followed by an asset price boom.
The inflation gap is usually found to be lower during XLB periods, which is in line with the finding in
Detken and Smets (2004) that inflation around boom periods is typically lower than in 'normal'
periods. The combination of a lower inflation gap and higher real GDP growth could be seen as an
indication that the majority of the asset price booms considered may have been triggered by
favourable supply shocks. While such favourable supply shocks would justify a rise in asset prices
(particularly stock prices), they often result in an overshooting of asset prices, as speculative ratherNBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 11
than fundamental investment motives gradually gain in importance. The fact that the interest rate
gaps are also quite low during these XLB periods suggests that monetary policy may have attached
too much weight to the initial downward impact on inflation of these favourable supply shocks, and
may therefore have been too accommodating, allowing the financial imbalances to build up. This
argument is very well documented in White (2006).
As almost half of our XLB periods took place in the 1970s, this favourable supply shock story comes
to some extent as a surprise, since this decade is generally seen as being characterised by poor
supply conditions (oil price shock, productivity slowdown, etc.) resulting in rather high and volatile
inflation. It could be that our result is driven by the particular definition of the inflation gap measure
(as the deviation from an HP-filtered trend) which could be especially problematic in the beginning
of the sample and could lead to spurious large negative inflation gaps during some of the excess
liquidity periods considered. Two types of robustness checks - the results of which are reported in
section 5.3 - suggest, however, that only part of the impact can indeed be attributed to the biased
estimate of the inflation gap at the beginning of the sample period.
Finally, the real aggregate asset price inflation rate is found to have been significantly higher for
XLB periods than for the excess liquidity periods that were not followed by an asset price boom.
Several factors could be behind this observation. A first explanation is a purely mechanical one: the
higher the asset price inflation before and during the period of sustained excess liquidity, the higher
the likelihood that the asset price gap will exceed the cut-off level of 10% during or after the period
of sustained excess liquidity. This suggests that this differential development of the aggregate asset
price inflation rate is simply induced by our definition of an asset price boom.
However, there is also a second (complementary) explanation which is more of an economic
nature. The fact that the aggregate asset price inflation rate has typically been lower in periods of
sustained excess liquidity that were not followed by an asset price boom could be seen as evidence
of the 'benign' character of sustained excess liquidity periods that are the result of large portfolio
shifts at times when, for instance, stock markets have been performing poorly. While the
accumulated excess liquidity might drive up asset prices once these portfolio shifts are reversed,
this would most likely not result in an asset price boom - as we defined it - given the poor
performance of asset prices in the previous quarters. Unfortunately, it is not possible to quantify the
relative importance of this complementary explanation for the differential developments in real
aggregate asset price inflation. However, the real aggregate asset price inflation rate during those
excess liquidity periods that were not followed by an asset price boom is not only low compared to
the XLB periods, but also compared to the 'normal' periods described in Table 2, which seems to
back up this additional interpretation.12 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
If this second explanation holds, one would expect to find that the real aggregate asset price
inflation rate also helps to differentiate between periods of sustained excess liquidity that have been
followed by a period of excess inflation and those that have not. In order to test this hypothesis, we
define a period of excess inflation as a period of at least three quarters during which the inflation
rate exceeds its trend level by more than 2 percentage points (i.e. about one standard deviation of
the estimated inflation gaps for all countries combined). We then find that those excess liquidity
periods that turned out not to be inflationary were indeed characterised by lower real aggregate
asset price inflation, although the difference is found to be significant at the 22% level only. The
median value of the real aggregate asset price inflation rate during these non-inflationary periods of
excess liquidity is only -0.3%, while it is 4.8% for the excess liquidity periods that have been
followed by excess inflation. When we restrict our attention to the first three quarters of the excess
liquidity periods, the difference becomes significant at the 3% level, as the median values then
stand at -1.5% and 5.8% respectively. These results suggest that the real aggregate asset price
inflation rate can indeed help to differentiate between those periods of excess liquidity that are not
likely to be followed by either an asset price boom or excess inflation and those periods that
represent a higher risk in this respect, based on an economic interpretation.
Finally, as some of the asset price booms had already started during the excess liquidity period, in
particular the longer ones, the averaging scheme applied could also have introduced an upward
bias into the median value of the real aggregate asset price inflation rate during the XLB periods.
However, we find the same significantly different behaviour of the real aggregate asset price
inflation rate when we look at the four quarters before the start of the periods of sustained excess
liquidity. This timing argument should thus be dismissed as an explanation for the differential
developments in the real aggregate asset price inflation rate, since periods of sustained excess
liquidity that are preceded by an asset price boom are not considered XLB periods.
To sum up, the preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from this descriptive analysis seems to be
that the driving factors of the excess liquidity build-up determine whether or not the period is likely to
be followed by an asset price boom. A period of excess liquidity is more likely to be followed by an
asset price boom when the strong real money growth is mainly related to low interest rates and high
economic growth and when at the same time the inflation gap is low. Mechanically speaking, a
higher real aggregate asset price inflation rate also increases the likelihood of the real aggregate
asset price gap passing the specified cut-off level. By contrast, a period of sustained excess liquidity
is less likely to be followed by an asset price boom when the strong real money growth mainly
results from portfolio shifts in the context of low real aggregate asset price inflation and low
economic growth. An additional feature of these excess liquidity periods is that the interest rate
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5.2  Logit  models
Having identified which variables seem to behave differently across the two types of excess liquidity
periods, we now test this in a more formal way by means of a logit model. The goal is to quantify the
relationship between these variables and the probability that the excess liquidity period will be
followed by an aggregate asset price boom.
The sample of observations again consists of the 40 periods of sustained excess liquidity that we
identified, but due to the unavailability of some relevant data in some versions of the model, we
reduce the sample to 38 periods of sustained excess liquidity (13 of which have been followed by
an asset price boom) for which all versions of the model could be estimated. The dependent
variable is constructed by setting it equal to 1 if the excess liquidity period is followed by an asset
price boom (the XLB periods) and equal to 0 in the other cases. We thus estimate how the
probability of the excess liquidity period being followed by an asset price boom can be explained by
developments in variables such as real GDP growth, interest rate gaps, real credit growth, the
inflation gap and real aggregate asset price inflation.
In order to judge the quality of the various models, we use three criteria. First, the estimated
coefficients need to have the expected sign and should be significantly different from zero. Second,
we analyse the predictive ability of the models by means of the classification table, assigning a
value of 1 to the fitted dependent variable when the predicted probability is larger than 50% and a
value of 0 otherwise. Finally, we look at the total gain (in terms of the percentage of correct
predictions) compared to a naive constant probability model that predicts that none of the excess
liquidity periods will be followed by an asset price boom, as the proportion of these periods is larger
in our sample than that of the XLB periods.
As a first step, we include each of the variables identified in section 5.1 separately. This exercise
broadly confirms the results of the descriptive analysis. Starting with the variables whose median
values did not differ significantly between XLB periods and the other excess liquidity periods (i.e.
the length of the excess liquidity period, the average size of the money gap and the degree of
synchronisation), their coefficient has the expected positive sign in the logit model, but only the
money gap coefficient is found to be statistically different from zero at the 10% level. The coefficient
of the length of the excess liquidity period, for example, is estimated to be positive in model (1.1) in
Table 5, but it is found not to be statistically different from zero at the 10% level.14 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
Table 5:  A selection of logit models with only one explanatory variable (and a constant)
Model (1.1) Model (1.2) Model (1.3) Model (1.4) Model (1.5)
Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value
Length excess liquidity period 0.17 0.04 0.16
Inflation gap -0.44 -0.09 0.08
Real GDP growth 0.46 0.10 0.02
Long-term interest rate gap -1.03 -0.22 0.02
Real credit growth 0.12 0.03 0.03
Correct predictions if Dep=0 24 out of 25 23 out of 25 22 out of 25 21 out of 25 23 out of 25
Correct predictions if Dep=1 3 out of 13 3 out of 13 4 out of 13 5 out 13 5 out of 13
Total gain (in pp) compared to
the constant probability model 5.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 7.9
Note: The constant probability model always predicts Dep=0.
The simple logit models also confirm the other results of the descriptive analysis: higher real money
growth, real GDP growth, real credit growth or real aggregate asset price inflation (in the four
quarters before the start of the excess liquidity period) all increase the probability of an asset price
boom, while a larger interest rate gap or a larger inflation gap reduce this probability. The inflation
gap coefficient in model (1.2), for example, is significantly negative at the 8% level. However, the
predictions of this model are correct in only 26 of the 38 cases, although this is an improvement on
the predictive power of a naive constant probability model by 2.6 percentage points. A similarly bad
prediction performance is found for models (1.3) and (1.4) which feature real GDP growth and the
long-term interest rate gap, respectively, with the expected signs. Finally, model (1.5) - in which the
significantly positive coefficient of real credit growth might reflect the developments in both
economic activity and interest rates - outperforms all other models with only one explanatory
variable (and a constant) in that it correctly predicts the outcome in 28 of the 38 cases. A general
feature of these 'univariate' models, however, is that they all perform quite badly in identifying the
XLB periods.
As a second step, we therefore combine several of these variables to build a logit model that is able
to accurately predict whether or not an excess liquidity period will be followed by an asset price
boom. Model 2.1 combines real credit growth and the long-term interest rate gap. The results in
Table 6 show that the signs of the coefficients are as expected. The probability of an asset price
boom increases with real credit growth and decreases with the size of the long-term interest rate
gap. While the predictive performance improves, particularly for the XLB periods, there are still a lot
of boom periods that are not correctly signalled by model 2.1. We therefore add the real aggregate
asset price inflation rate in the four quarters before the start of the excess liquidity period to obtain
model 2.2. This variable shows up with the expected positive sign, but the coefficient of real credit
growth becomes statistically insignificant. So, we can reduce the model to version (2.3) according to
which the probability of an asset price boom following an excess liquidity period increases with theNBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 15
real aggregate asset price inflation rate in the four quarters before the start of the excess liquidity
period and decreases with the long-term interest rate gap.
Table 6:  A selection of logit models with more than one explanatory variable
Model (2.1) Model (2.2) Model (2.3)
Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value
Real credit growth 0.12 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.49
Long-term interest rate gap -1.03 -0.22 0.04 -1.50 -0.27 0.02 -1.41 -0.26 0.02
Real aggregate asset price inflation
(before) 0.28 0.05 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.01
Correct predictions if Dep=0 23 out of 25 23 out of 25 24 out of 25
Correct predictions if Dep=1 7 out of 13 11 out of 13 11 out of 13
Total gain (in pp) compared to the
constant probability model 13.2 23.7 26.3
Note: The constant probability model always predicts Dep=0.
When multiplying the estimated coefficients with the scale factor to obtain the marginal effect of the
explanatory variables, our preferred model (2.3) suggests that, at the sample mean, one additional
percentage point in the long-term interest rate gap would reduce the probability of an asset price
boom by 26 percentage points. At the same time, one additional percentage point in the real
aggregate asset price inflation rate (in the four quarters before the start of the excess liquidity
period) would increase this probability by 4 percentage points. When comparing these marginal
effects, however, one should take account of the fact that the range of values spanned by the real
aggregate asset price inflation rate is much wider. It is therefore preferable to compare the marginal
effects of changes in both variables of the size of one standard deviation compared to the sample
mean. The marginal effects then amount to -26 and +37 percentage points respectively.
Table 6 also shows that, overall, the preferred model (2.3) correctly predicts 92% of the 38
observations. Only two of the 13 boom periods are not predicted by the model, while in one case,
the model wrongly predicts an asset price boom. Compared to a naive constant probability model,
our preferred model results in a total gain of 26.3 percentage points.
These results suggest that only some periods of sustained excess liquidity have signalled an
aggregate asset price boom. They thus warn against a 'naive' type of monetary analysis that would
simply look at measures of excess liquidity. Instead, a thorough analysis of the possible
determinants of the accumulated excess liquidity is needed before any judgement can be made
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5.3  Some  robustness  checks
A first type of robustness check aims at alleviating the problem of the beginning of the sample bias
in the estimated inflation gap measure, by extending the dataset with data on consumer prices for
the 1960s. This extension has no impact on the identification of the periods of sustained excess
liquidity or of the aggregate asset price booms. It only affects the developments in the inflation gap
measure during some of the excess liquidity periods considered. In fact, when restricting our
attention to the more important changes in the average inflation gap (i.e. those of more than 15
basis points in absolute value), we find eight periods of sustained excess liquidity during which the
average inflation gap becomes less negative or even positive (six of which were followed by an
asset price boom) and one period (that was not followed by an asset price boom) during which the
negative inflation gap becomes even more negative. This suggests that the impact of the inflation
gap on the probability of ending up in an aggregate asset price boom will most likely be smaller than
suggested in the previous two sections.
First, the median value of the inflation gap during the XLB periods increases to -0.7 percentage
point (compared to -1.0 percentage point in Table 4), but it does remain lower than the median
value of the inflation gap during the other excess liquidity periods of -0.1 percentage point, although
the difference is only significant at the 17% level. When we only consider the first three quarters of
the excess liquidity periods, the differential developments in the inflation gap are statistically
significant at the 6% level. Second, in the estimated logit model with the inflation gap (and a
constant), its coefficient has the expected negative sign, but its marginal effect declines from -0.09
to -0.08 and the significance level rises from 8% to 13%. Overall, this first type of robustness check
suggests that only part of the impact found in the previous two sections can indeed be attributed to
the biased estimate of the inflation gap at the beginning of the sample period.
A second type of robustness check aims at obtaining a sample of XLB periods that is more evenly
distributed over time, to test for the impact of the dominance of the 1970s periods. This can be
achieved by using an alternative cut-off level, for example, the third quartile. In that setting, a period
of sustained excess liquidity is defined as at least three consecutive quarters during which the
money-to-GDP ratio exceeds its trend level by more than 2% (instead of 3.75% in the first exercise).
Similarly, an aggregate asset price boom is defined as a period of at least three consecutive
quarters during which the real aggregate asset price gap is larger than 4.5% (instead of 10%).
These alternative criteria enable 57 periods of sustained excess liquidity to be identified, 24 of
which have been followed by an asset price boom. Unlike the XLB periods that were identified on
the basis of the one standard deviation cut-off level, these XLB periods are distributed somewhat
more evenly over time, as illustrated in Table 7. At the same time, a period now classifies more
easily as an 'exceptional' period (in terms of developments in liquidity or asset prices), which couldNBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 17
be a serious disadvantage of this exercise given the importance of taking due account of the non-
linearities involved in the whole analysis.
Table 7:  Distribution over time of the excess liquidity periods that were followed by an asset price
boom for different cut-off levels
One standard deviation Third quartile
1970-1979 6 43% 9 38%
1980-1989 3 21% 8 33%
1990-1999 5 36% 6 25%
2000-2003 0 0% 1 4%
The lower cut-off level results in somewhat longer periods of excess liquidity: a typical excess
liquidity period now lasts for about 8 quarters, compared to 7 quarters in the case of the higher cut-
off level of about one standard deviation. It is therefore not surprising that some of the differential
developments that are found during the first three quarters of the excess liquidity periods become
statistically insignificant at the 10% level once the entire excess liquidity period is considered,
particularly for the nominal variables. A period of excess liquidity is typically followed by a widening
of the inflation gap. The probability of this inflation pickup already starting before the end of the
excess liquidity period clearly increases with the length of that period. In addition, central banks will
most likely react to the higher inflation by raising their key interest rates, which would then also give
rise to higher market interest rates during the longer periods of sustained excess liquidity. In
general, however, the results found in sections 5.1 and 5.2 are confirmed. As is shown in Table 8,
the XLB periods typically recorded stronger real money growth which seems to have been
supported by stronger real GDP growth and lower interest rate gaps. The hypothesis that these
traditional determinants of money demand play a role is further supported by the fact that real credit
growth has tended to be higher during the XLB periods too. The inflation gap is again found to have
been typically lower during XLB periods, although this differential development now occurs almost
exclusively during the first quarters of the excess liquidity periods.18 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
Table  8:  Macroeconomic and financial developments during excess liquidity periods, categorised
according to whether or not they have been followed by an asset price boom
Periods of sustained excess liquidity
Whole period First three quarters
Boom  No  boom  WMW-test  Boom  No  boom WMW-test
Real money growth 6.5 5.2 8.8 7.4 *
Real GDP growth 2.9 1.8 ** 3.0 1.2 **
Short-term interest rate gap -0.6 -0.2 -1.0 0.3 **
Long-term interest rate gap -0.5 0.2 ** -0.6 0.2 ***
Real credit growth 7.9 3.9 *** 8.4 4.6 **
Length 9.0 8.0
Money gap 4.4 3.8 4.1 3.8
Synchronisation 5.2 5.6 5.0 5.7
Inflation gap -0.4 0.1 -0.9 -0.1 **
Real aggregate asset price inflation 6.1 -0.7 *** 5.6 -0.7 ***
Note: The asterisks (***,** and *) denote that the null hypothesis of equal medians is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively on the basis of the rank-based Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
For the estimation of the logit models, we again have to reduce our sample of periods of sustained
excess liquidity due to the unavailability of some relevant data in some versions of the model. We
proceed with a sample of 54 periods (22 of which have been followed by an aggregate asset price
boom) for which all versions of the model could be estimated. Table 9 and Table 10 present a
selection of the results.
The 'univariate' models indicate that the probability of an asset price boom increases with higher
real money growth, real GDP growth, real credit growth or real aggregate asset price inflation (in the
four quarters before the start of the excess liquidity period) and decreases with a larger interest rate
gap or a larger inflation gap. In the 'multivariate' model (2.1b) in Table 10, the coefficients of real
credit growth and the long-term interest rate gap both have the expected sign, but this model
performs only slightly better than the univariate model (1.5b) which only includes real credit growth.
We therefore add the real aggregate asset price inflation rate in the year before the start of the
excess liquidity period to obtain model (2.2b). However, the coefficient of this additional variable is
not significant at the 10% level, although the model clearly performs better in predicting aggregate
asset price booms. Combining this variable with the long-term interest rate gap only (model 2.3b)
turns out to be the preferred multivariate model. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level and
have the correct sign. In addition, this model outperforms model (2.1b) in that it correctly predicts
two more observations. Although the structure of this preferred model (2.3b) is similar to that of the
preferred model (2.3) in section 5.2, the marginal effect of the retained explanatory variables at their
sample mean is somewhat smaller. In addition, this model (2.3b) also has lower predictive power.
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92% of the observations. Although this model (2.3b) does not perform as well as the preferred
model (2.3), the overall conclusion remains the same, which suggests that it is fairly robust to the
distribution over time of the periods considered.
Table 9:  A selection of logit models with only one explanatory variable (and a constant)

















Length excess liquidity period 0.09 0.02 0.18
Inflation gap -0.43 -0.10 0.07
Real GDP growth 0.35 0.08 0.02
Long-term interest rate gap -0.88 -0.21 0.03
Real credit growth 0.18 0.04 0.01
Correct predictions if Dep=0 26 out of 32 27 out of 32 24 out of 32 24 out of 32 28 out of 32
Correct predictions if Dep=1 6 out of 22 6 out of 22 5 out of 22 11 out 22 11 out of 22
Total gain (in pp) compared to
the constant probability model 0.0 1.85 -5.6 5.6 13.0
Note: The constant probability model always predicts Dep=0.
Table 10: A selection of logit models with more than one explanatory variable
Model (2.1b) Model (2.2b) Model (2.3b)
Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value Coeff. Marg.
effect P-value
Real credit growth 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.05
Long-term interest rate gap -0.98 -0.23 0.03 -1.00 -0.23 0.02 -0.98 -0.23 0.02
Real aggregate asset price
inflation (before) 0.04 0.01 0.42 0.10 0.02 0.02
Correct predictions if Dep=0 27 out of 32 28 out of 32 28 out of 32
Correct predictions if Dep=1 13 out of 22 15 out of 22 14 out of 22
Total gain (in pp) compared to the
constant probability model 14.8 20.4 18.5
Note: The constant probability model always predicts Dep=0.
6 .  R EAL-TIME IDENTIFICATION OF EXCESS LIQUIDITY PERIODS
The results of the ex post analysis reported in section 5 suggest that the combination of high money
growth and strong credit expansion, low interest rates, strong real GDP growth and low inflation
should be seen as signalling an increasing risk of an imminent asset price boom. While this finding
is important in itself, the challenge is to make it operational for the policymaker who has to assess
the economic situation in real time. More specifically, this implies that he has to estimate the various
trend developments and gap measures in real time, i.e. using only information that is available to
him at the time he is making an assessment of whether or not a period of sustained excess liquidity
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Borio and Lowe (2002; 2004) and Detken and Smets (2004) approximate such a real-time situation
by calculating the gap measures recursively, i.e. by first applying the HP-filter for a starting sample
and then gradually extending the window for the HP-filter quarter by quarter. In this way, the
calculated money gap measure for, say, the first quarter of 1985 is obtained by using information up
to the first quarter of 1985 only.
Applying these simple recursive HP-filters to our database (using the period 1970Q1-1975Q4 as the
starting sample) and comparing the resulting recursive money gap estimates with the full sample
cut-off level of 3.75% results in 38 periods of sustained excess liquidity. Ten of these 38 periods are
new in the sense that they do not (partly) overlap with one of the 40 periods that were identified
when using the full sample information. Half of the 12 full sample periods that were no longer
identified as excess liquidity periods in real time are situated in the 1970s. The distribution over time
of the recursively estimated periods of sustained excess liquidity in Table 11 shows that the relative
weight of the 1970s periods is smaller than in the ex post analysis in Table 1. The dominance of the
1990s periods is confirmed, however. The table further shows that a typical recursively identified
period of excess liquidity still lasts for about 6 quarters, although we now also find some very long
periods of sustained excess liquidity, i.e. of more than four years.
Table 11: Distribution of the recursively estimated periods of excess liquidity over time




1st quartile Median 3rd  quartile  1st  quartile Median 3rd quartile
1970-2003 38 4.0 6.0 15.0 5.0 5.7 6.2
1970-1979 7 4.0 5.0 7.0 5.1 6.0 8.2
1980-1989 12 5.8 7.5 15.0 4.6 5.4 6.1
1990-1999 17 4.0 6.0 15.0 5.0 5.8 6.1
2000-2003 2 11.0 5.3
At first sight, this simple exercise suggests that it is not easy to correctly identify periods of
sustained excess liquidity in real time. However, it should also be clear that this type of analysis
most likely underestimates the policymaker's ability to extract the underlying trend in the broad
money-to-GDP ratio. First, this approach assumes that the policymaker has no information about
the future developments in the variables considered, which is most likely not the case even though
forecasts will never be perfect. Second, this simulation exercise does not allow the policymaker to
adjust his assessment of the previous quarter once new information becomes available. It therefore
reduces the likelihood of correctly identifying a period of at least three consecutive quarters of
excess liquidity. A full-scale real-time exercise - taking account of these issues and of further dataNBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 21
issues such as the publication delay and data revisions - is, however, far beyond the scope of this
paper.
As argued above, the results in this section most likely paint too negative a picture about the
policymaker's ability to identify the excess liquidity periods in real time. Nevertheless, this illustration
suggests that it is very important to continue putting effort into forecasting monetary and economic
developments in order to be able to extract the trend developments more accurately.
7 .  C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we analysed whether a period of sustained excess liquidity can signal an aggregate
asset price boom and, more specifically, under what conditions such an excess liquidity period is
more likely to be followed by an asset price boom.
The fact that only about one-third of the identified periods of sustained excess liquidity has been
followed by an asset price boom tends to warn against any 'naive' kind of monetary analysis.
Moreover, factors such as the length of the excess liquidity period or the average money gap do not
seem to matter in a systematic way.
At the same time, our analysis suggests that the periods of sustained excess liquidity that have
been followed by an aggregate asset price boom can be distinguished from those periods of excess
liquidity that have not. The results suggest that the combination of high money and credit growth,
low interest rates, strong real GDP growth and low inflation should be seen as signalling an
increasing risk of an imminent aggregate asset price boom. If the excess liquidity period is
characterised by high interest rates, low real GDP growth, high inflation and exceptionally low asset
price inflation, however, the risk of an imminent asset price boom seems rather low.
All in all, these results stress that there is no simple link between money and asset prices, as
Gouteron and Szpiro (2005) also found. However, if one takes account of the likely non-linearities in
the relationship and if one combines the information from broad monetary aggregates with that of
other variables, some indication can be gained on the probability of the excess liquidity period being
followed by an asset price boom. It should be stressed, however, that this analysis does not say
anything about the marginal predictive power of excess liquidity, nor does it imply causality between
excess liquidity and asset prices.
While our paper in no way tries to provide the best leading indicator for asset price booms, our
findings do seem to support the ECB Governing Council's concern in recent years, as the strong
money growth in the euro area coincided with very low interest rates and considerable asset price
rises in some euro area countries.22 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007
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ANNEX - DATA SOURCES
The paper is based on quarterly data. The period covered is 1970Q1 (whenever possible) until
2005Q4. We consider 18 industrial countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Data on the real aggregate asset price indices (deflated by consumer prices) have been kindly
supplied by Steve Arthur from the BIS. These indices are the weighted average of three sub-indices
(for equity, residential property, and commercial property prices) whenever available, the weight
being the actual share of the asset components in the respective economy. The underlying
methodology is described in detail in Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994).
For the other variables used in the analysis, various databases have been combined in order to
obtain a consistent dataset for the period covered. These data sources are: the BIS, the IMF's
International Financial Statistics (IFS), Eurostat, the OECD Economic Outlook, the ECB, as well as
National Statistical Institutes when no other source was available.
Data for broad money and for credit to the private sector are taken from the IFS, codes 34+35 and
32d respectively. For the euro area countries, data from 1997Q4 onwards have been reconstructed
on the basis of detailed flow data from the ECB in order to match the IFS definitions.
Data for interest rates are mainly from the BIS database, supplemented with data from the OECD,
the IFS and national sources (when no other source was available).
Data for consumer prices are from the BIS, except for EU countries since the 1990s, where we
used Eurostat's HICP data instead. For Australia, national data are used.
Data for GDP are mainly from the OECD, in some cases supplemented by data from the BIS.
When series showed significant structural breaks as indicated by a TRAMO application, breaks
have been corrected one by one, either by using alternative sources, estimates or interpolations, or
on a judgmental basis.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 117 - AUGUST 2007 25
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